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The Gloomy Scenario of Italy’s Default 
Diego Valiante 
hat will happen if Italy is not able to 
implement structural reforms and if 
international institutions, such as the EFSF 
and the IMF, do not intervene with sufficient resources 
to prevent Europe’s second-largest economy from 
defaulting on its debt? The potential costs of such a 
scenario are, as of today, unquantifiable. But what we 
can anticipate is that the Italian economic system 
would certainly embark on a perverse path that would 
follow three phases: liquidity crisis and insolvency; 
deflationary pressures; and finally inflationary 
pressures and economic and political instability. 
While Italy is struggling to approve tough structural 
measures to consolidate its public finances, all 
solutions put in place so far to contain the costs of 
debt at European level have been ineffective to get a 
hold on financial markets. The decisions reached at 
the December 9th European Council are no exception, 
even though they set the grounds for a new 
institutional order among eurozone member states. 
Does this agreement sufficiently tackle the ongoing 
liquidity crisis? In other words, what is going to 
happen from now onwards, until the 
‘intergovernmental agreement’ sets up and enforces a 
fully coordinated governance of the eurozone’s 
economic policy (through the European Stability 
Mechanism) and perhaps decides to give a full 
mandate to the European Central Bank?1 At first 
glance, the EU Council decision seems a rather weak 
response to the short-term market distress and an 
overhanging eurozone government debt of over €8 
trillion.  
                                                        
1 It is reasonable to expect member states to modify the 
Treaty and allow the ECB to become the ‘lender of last 
resort’ once the new institutional framework is put in place. 
A rather different picture emerges on the other side of the 
Atlantic, where the Federal Reserve enjoys a full mandate 
and effectively has purchased Treasuries for roughly $1.7 
trillion over a debt of $7.7 trillion (over 22%) to stabilise 
yields, and so far with good success. 
This ‘muddling-through’ solution is based on three 
pillars and the action of the national central banks 
(individually), the ECB, and the EU Council through 
the EFSF. First, the securitisation mechanism backed 
by national guarantees (the European Financial 
Stability Fund, plus the European Financial Stability 
Mechanism) has been allowed to raise up to €500 
billion,2 in competition with national member states’ 
issuances. However, the EFSF may lose its triple A 
rating if France would lose its triple A rating, which 
seems quite likely. In addition, if a bigger country like 
Italy would need external support, the amount that can 
be raised on secondary markets would be much lower 
(as Italy’s guarantees would step out). Second, an 
additional direct injection of €200 billion is going 
from European national central banks (including non-
eurozone countries, such as the UK) to a fund 
managed by the International Monetary Fund (with all 
the implicit political ramifications), which will 
provide additional firepower to face the liquidity 
crisis. Single eurozone countries in trouble would 
need therefore to ask for a bilateral loan from the IMF. 
Third, with the recent decision to boost liquidity 
injections in the banking system, the ECB expects 
banks to invest more in euro area sovereign debt. The 
situation in the interbank market is so difficult that the 
ECB does not consider banks’ moral hazard an 
immediate concern. In a context of no real control 
over multiple rational agents, this ECB’s decision 
would most likely push banks to adjust their 
maturities (liabilities), but it will not necessarily put 
them in a position to buy more sovereign debt, even 
though they are receiving full support from the ECB. 
The ECB assumes that they would buy eurozone 
sovereign bonds to stabilise their funding needs over 
time, disregarding the likelihood of disorderly defaults 
in the eurozone. 
                                                        
2 The plan to expand it to roughly €1 trillion is going very 
slowly, and is currently before national Parliaments for their 
approval. 
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Among those countries exposed to the liquidity crisis, 
Italy is under the strongest pressures, with a debt of 
over €300 billion to reach maturity in 2012 (not to 
mention the issuance of new debt). Most of it should 
be raised by March (more than €115 billion).3 What 
could potentially happen if these short-term 
safeguards and the long-term agreement are not 
enough or do not consistently materialise or simply if 
some national court or a referendum would block or 
delay this process of greater fiscal coordination, 
preventing the ECB from intervening even in the 
long-run? What are the potential costs of not 
responding swiftly to future liquidity crises and 
allowing contagion to spread even more? This 
‘pessimistic’ scenario can be split into three phases, 
which are likely going to happen in an environment 
with no or negative growth (see the European 
Commission’s forecasts; European Commission, 
2011) and no ECB intervention. The first phase is 
partially taking place now. 
1. Liquidity crisis and insolvency 
- Governments under stress are unable to carry out 
tough stability measures aimed at restarting 
growth, abating public expenditures, and curbing 
public debt. Fiscal measures are not enough to 
bring debts onto a sustainable path. 
- Interest rates on public debt would rise to 
unsustainable levels. Once above this threshold, 
rates would become more volatile and go up at a 
much faster pace, as the market would gradually 
become illiquid (fewer investors would be willing 
to buy).  
- The ECB does not intervene with a long-term 
transparent plan to reduce and control interest 
rates (quantitative easing). Other institutions may 
not have enough firepower. 
- A lack of liquidity and the gradual loss of market 
access to money worsen the country’s ability to 
repay the debt. In a few weeks or months 
(depending on the country’s solvability 
conditions), the widespread eurozone crisis would 
transform from a liquidity crisis into an 
insolvency crisis. In effect, in a broader downturn, 
privatisations and sales of public assets would be 
less profitable than in stable market conditions. 
For instance, there might not be enough liquidity 
to sell Italy’s public real estate at a price reflecting 
fair market value.  
- Liquidity crisis and inability to meet key public 
expenditures (salaries, pensions, etc.). The State 
may become temporarily insolvent with respect to 
its obligations to its citizens and firms.  
                                                        
3 Italian Treasury’s estimates at the end of November 2011. 
- The ECB and IMF still do not want to intervene, 
as member countries may have not reached a 
political agreement on how such an intervention 
should be done. 
- Italy and/or other member states declare ‘default’ 
on some part of their debt. It does not matter 
whether this is partial or total default, but when it 
does happen, the lost of confidence – and with it, 
market access – is irreparable, often for years to 
come.4  
- In the hope of avoiding default, some member 
states may decide to organise a quick exit from the 
euro area. However, this solution is unworkable, 
at least in the short-term. There is no way, without 
a third-party intervention to inject liquidity, to 
avoid the default. 
2. Deflationary pressures 
- With no possibility for the country to curb debt 
and repay the loans closest to maturity, and with 
60% of debt held by domestic investors, huge 
losses are passed onto savers and banks, and not 
only in Italy.  
- Fear quickly spreads in the financial and 
economic system, and capital moves definitively 
away to ‘safer’ euro countries. Italian banks are 
already experiencing capital flight and they are 
heavily dependent on the short-term (up to 3 
months) lending windows of the ECB. The 
quantity of M3 in the Italian financial system is at 
a historically low level (Manasse, 2011). The ECB 
already today struggles to make the interbank 
market properly work. 
- Other euro member states would freeze foreign 
assets of Italian banks to deal with losses imposed 
on foreign banks by an Italian default. 
- Due to the high risk of insolvency for individuals 
and firms, a strong credit crunch would bring 
down the whole Italian economy and indirectly its 
banking system, pushing them in a downward 
spiral. There are early warnings that a huge credit 
crunch has already started. 
- Knock-on effects will be felt by small investors 
and firms, which will start to queue at banks to 
withdraw money from their deposits for fear that 
the banks are undercapitalised and may be on the 
brink of default.  
- The Italian government is forced to block or limit 
withdrawals from current accounts, to save the 
financial and economic system from total 
                                                        
4 Since its default in 2001, Argentina has been unable to 
access markets, despite having defaulted on a debt of only 
40% of GDP. Italy only has a debt of 120% over GDP. 
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collapse.  
- There are no resources at any level to be invested 
in growth, and strong deflationary pressures 
would push the country into a prolonged period of 
negative growth. 
- Lower-than-expected fiscal revenues and the bad 
shape of the financial system would make Italy’s 
situation even more unsustainable. 
- If even the ECB and IMF do not intervene 
substantially to provide liquidity directly to the 
country, the exit of Italy from the euro area would 
become inevitable, with huge direct and indirect 
costs for the whole euro area (Eichengreen, 2007). 
The re-denomination of contracts in national 
currency would entail an additional dead loss on 
savings and investments. Many transactions may 
be blocked (also in court trials) for months or 
years.  
- The Italian banking system definitely collapses. 
The eurozone would fall apart or would be re-built 
around a few ‘safer’ countries, such as Germany, 
Luxembourg and the Netherlands. 
3. Inflationary pressures and political/ 
economic instability 
- In addition to salaries and pension cuts, due to the 
inability to access financial markets, the 
devaluation of the national currency to generate 
cash flows in the aftermath of the euro exit would 
increase inflationary pressures on individuals and 
firms, who would incur additional losses if they 
were not able to transfer assets abroad.  
- Due to the high insolvency risk, interest rates for 
loans and mortgages would skyrocket and the 
additional credit crunch would plunge the 
economy and the financial system into a long 
period of crisis. 
- The economy may grow again soon, thanks to the 
strong devaluation (see Argentina), but this would 
happen in a long-distressed financial and 
economic system, left with no resources to boost 
long-term investments and to meet public 
expenditures. 
With no economic and financial stability, direct 
foreign investment would drop even more, at least 
in the short term. 
- Indices of population poverty would rise. 
- These intertwined mechanisms and low internal 
consumption would generate a dangerous spiral 
that would throw the entire country in a prolonged 
period of economic, political and social crisis. 
- In this difficult situation, radical and extremist 
parties may gain strong consensus over time. 
- Migration flows towards other European countries 
would grow at unsustainable levels, causing 
strong diplomatic problems among EU countries. 
If the euro breaks up, most likely the whole 
European Union would fall apart. Agreements, 
such as Schengen, would be suspended in the 
short-term.  
The intensity and speed of such a ‘doom and gloom’ 
scenario may change depending on the fundamentals 
of the country. However, the likelihood of avoiding an 
escalation of the problem is certainly higher if 
European institutions, in particular the ECB, would 
intervene to prevent the default and then to launch a 
eurozone federalist agreement for fiscal policies and a 
stronger budget to narrow countries’ disparities. 
Member states would be free to take it or leave it. 
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